Inequality, institutions and cooperation

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Inequality, institutions and cooperation. / Markussen, Thomas; Sharma, Smriti; Singhal, Saurabh; Tarp, Finn.

I: European Economic Review, Bind 138, 103842, 09.2021.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningfagfællebedømt

Harvard

Markussen, T, Sharma, S, Singhal, S & Tarp, F 2021, 'Inequality, institutions and cooperation', European Economic Review, bind 138, 103842. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103842

APA

Markussen, T., Sharma, S., Singhal, S., & Tarp, F. (2021). Inequality, institutions and cooperation. European Economic Review, 138, [103842]. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103842

Vancouver

Markussen T, Sharma S, Singhal S, Tarp F. Inequality, institutions and cooperation. European Economic Review. 2021 sep;138. 103842. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103842

Author

Markussen, Thomas ; Sharma, Smriti ; Singhal, Saurabh ; Tarp, Finn. / Inequality, institutions and cooperation. I: European Economic Review. 2021 ; Bind 138.

Bibtex

@article{7b50d0ce5c1248bbbc69ca88c404a784,
title = "Inequality, institutions and cooperation",
abstract = "We examine whether the relationship between economic inequality and voluntary cooperation is influenced by the quality of local institutions, as proxied by corruption. We use representative data from a large-scale lab-in-the-field public goods experiment with over 1,300 participants across rural Vietnam. Our results show that inequality adversely affects aggregate contributions due to high endowment individuals contributing a significantly smaller share than those with low endowments. This negative effect of inequality on cooperation is stronger in high corruption environments. We find that corruption is associated with pessimistic beliefs about others{\textquoteright} contributions in heterogeneous groups, highlighting the indirect costs of corruption that are understudied in the literature. These findings have implications for public policies aimed at resolving local collective action problems.",
keywords = "Corruption, Inequality, Institutions, Lab-in-field experiment, Public goods, Faculty of Social Sciences, Inequality, Institutions, corruption, public goods, Lab-in-field experiment",
author = "Thomas Markussen and Smriti Sharma and Saurabh Singhal and Finn Tarp",
note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2021",
year = "2021",
month = sep,
doi = "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103842",
language = "English",
volume = "138",
journal = "European Economic Review",
issn = "0014-2921",
publisher = "Elsevier",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Inequality, institutions and cooperation

AU - Markussen, Thomas

AU - Sharma, Smriti

AU - Singhal, Saurabh

AU - Tarp, Finn

N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2021

PY - 2021/9

Y1 - 2021/9

N2 - We examine whether the relationship between economic inequality and voluntary cooperation is influenced by the quality of local institutions, as proxied by corruption. We use representative data from a large-scale lab-in-the-field public goods experiment with over 1,300 participants across rural Vietnam. Our results show that inequality adversely affects aggregate contributions due to high endowment individuals contributing a significantly smaller share than those with low endowments. This negative effect of inequality on cooperation is stronger in high corruption environments. We find that corruption is associated with pessimistic beliefs about others’ contributions in heterogeneous groups, highlighting the indirect costs of corruption that are understudied in the literature. These findings have implications for public policies aimed at resolving local collective action problems.

AB - We examine whether the relationship between economic inequality and voluntary cooperation is influenced by the quality of local institutions, as proxied by corruption. We use representative data from a large-scale lab-in-the-field public goods experiment with over 1,300 participants across rural Vietnam. Our results show that inequality adversely affects aggregate contributions due to high endowment individuals contributing a significantly smaller share than those with low endowments. This negative effect of inequality on cooperation is stronger in high corruption environments. We find that corruption is associated with pessimistic beliefs about others’ contributions in heterogeneous groups, highlighting the indirect costs of corruption that are understudied in the literature. These findings have implications for public policies aimed at resolving local collective action problems.

KW - Corruption

KW - Inequality

KW - Institutions

KW - Lab-in-field experiment

KW - Public goods

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - Inequality

KW - Institutions

KW - corruption

KW - public goods

KW - Lab-in-field experiment

U2 - 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103842

DO - 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103842

M3 - Journal article

AN - SCOPUS:85111333411

VL - 138

JO - European Economic Review

JF - European Economic Review

SN - 0014-2921

M1 - 103842

ER -

ID: 279196092